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COMPLEX CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
A U.S. Military-centric Perspective
John A. Gentry
U.S. military forces long have conducted operations having objectives otherthan, or in addition to, combat. In 1996, the Congressional Research Service
counted over 250 foreign deployments of U.S. troops since 1798 but only five de-
clared wars.1 The United States sent a significant number of military personnel
to Somalia in 1992–93 to feed starving people, then in 1993–94 to help “build
the nation” of Somalia. The 1994 deployment to Haiti ostensibly was undertaken
to “restore democracy” by returning President Jean-Baptiste Aristide to power.
Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 have aimed at keeping the
peace and returning Bosnia to its momentary status as a unified, multiethnic
country. The 1999 deployment to Kosovo had a similarly lofty moral objective.
The military aspects of such complex national endeavors have been labeled,
somewhat inadequately, as “low-intensity conflicts” or “military operations
other than war.”2 Such operations have significant civil-military components.
That is, in these operations armed forces have objectives or employ means that
directly involve local civilians and civil institutions, including governments. In
such cases American military personnel typically work closely with civilian em-
ployees of other U.S. government agencies, international organizations (includ-
ing foreign-aid agencies of other governments and components of the United
Nations), and nongovernmental organizations. Virtually
by definition, the participation of such a variety of
groups makes these operations complex.
The U.S. armed forces collectively and many members
of the American electorate are clearly uncomfortable
with some of these roles. This discomfort stems partly
from such unpleasant transformations as the descent of
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“nation building” in Somalia into the dragging of dead American soldiers
through the streets of Mogadishu, and of the reconst i tut ion of
Bosnia-Herzegovina into a complicated, seemingly open-ended mission with
little prospect of success. Many Americans, including military personnel, are
uneasy (and ignorant) about these undertakings, question whether they are in-
deed military missions, are insecure about the ability of the military to perform
them, and worry that such apparently nonmilitary missions detract from real
military tasks. There is good reason for some of the concern. U.S. military forces
have not performed well in such operations in recent years. The root cause of the
problem is a mismatch between the demands of such operations—U.S. national
objectives and the situations themselves—and the organization, doctrine, and
even culture of the U.S. units assigned to perform them. The purpose of this pa-
per is to identify some of the strengths and limitations of U.S. forces in complex
civil-military operations and to suggest ways to improve their performance.
Poor understanding of the essential elements of civil-military opera-
tions—compounded by lack of a common terminology—result in inability to
relate them to overall national objectives. Even within the special-operations
community, including its civil-affairs personnel, there is debate about the mean-
ing of such basic terms as “civil affairs” and “civil-military operations.” This con-
fusion is exacerbated when concepts are communicated across institutional and
cultural lines. Civilian and foreign military organizations differ from the U.S.
military, and from each other, in cultural norms and in perceptions and expecta-
tions of, and goals for, relationships between military units and civil institu-
tions—which, broadly defined, include religious, social, and labor
organizations. Recent descriptions of humanitarian-relief and peacekeeping
missions have inadvertently made matters worse by using different terms for
similar concepts and inappropriately generalizing from specific operations.
Many commentators have argued that the American military of the Cold War
era, which the United States largely retains, is not well suited to complex
civil-military (or “complex contingency”) operations. Proposals to develop new
capabilities and doctrine, however, while laudable, usually focus on tactical op-
erations without examining civil-military operations in a larger political con-
text.3 They generally fall short in at least one of two key areas: they do not
address the profound cultural or psychological aversion that “warfighters” have
to peacekeeping and civil-military operations generally; or they do not propose
institutional changes, including structural changes and altered incentives, that
would enable the U.S. military to plan and execute civil-military operations con-
sistently well.
The U.S. military and the civil agencies of the governments of the interna-
tional community with which the military regularly works need badly a
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common framework for civil-military operations. They need also concepts and
institutions that facilitate planning, the execution of missions, communica-
tions, and assessments of results. Such a shared understanding would help the
American military in the civil aspects of all its operations, including conven-
tional high-intensity wars, in which civil aspects rightly receive comparatively
modest attention. Such a framework would have helped us to conduct better the
important civil aspects of the war in Vietnam. It would also be helpful if the De-
fense Department ever has to grapple with domestic “consequence manage-
ment” in the wake of large-scale attacks on civilians within the United States.
The framework presented in this article is U.S. military-centric; that is, it fo-
cuses on civil-military operations from the perspective of the American armed
forces. The process could be reoriented easily, however, to other institutions, in-
cluding international civil agencies or even the “targets” of peacekeeping or
peace enforcement. The examples used here come from peacekeeping opera-
tions, because those undertakings are conceptually and operationally complex.
Dealings with civilians during conventional combat in sparsely settled areas are
comparatively simple in concept, if not execution; they also fall within this con-
struct. Domestic civil-military operations, however, present unique political
and constitutional issues (which are beyond the scope of this article).
Civil-military operations contain four general stages, as well as feedback
mechanisms that work (or fail) during the conduct of each operation and that
(ideally) ensure that the lessons learned in each operation influence decisions
about others. The four stages are problem identification, mission determina-
tion, planning and execution, and the processes of measurement of effectiveness
and of learning.
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
The world is a complicated place. Some events are small and isolated, some re-
flect massive civilizational changes yet move slowly, while others proceed rap-
idly and with great and immediate consequences. Intelligence agencies,
diplomatic services, academics, and journalists watch these events with varying
degrees of intensity. Governments typically track only a small part of the global
human situation, generally caring little about the rest.
Sometimes situations change in ways that alter observers’ perceptions and
lead governments, international organizations, or nongovernmental organiza-
tions to assess that they have become problems—challenges requiring action
and, one hopes, susceptible to solution. Usually a tangible event or set of events
triggers that reassessment—war, political instability, famine, and so on. How-
ever much damage or death has occurred in a given case, however, governments
and organizations conclude that a problem has arisen only if they determine
G E N T R Y 5 9
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that the course of a situation is “bad” for some reason related to itself. Thus, a
government may conclude that events so threaten its political or economic in-
terests, or so engage its ideological or moral sensibilities, as to oblige it to act.
The latter factor is particularly strong in natural disasters or apparent atrocities
against noncombatants—and it has become a major component of American
foreign policy. Governments also justify interventions in moral terms to mask
geopolitical, financial, or domestic political issues, like stopping an influx of un-
wanted refugees.4 Relatedly, the “CNN effect” produced by televised images of
suffering has generated public demands for action; it has been a key definer es-
pecially of humanitarian problems. (Television, it must be said, depicts only
poorly the political complexities that produce such suffering, leading to inap-
propriately narrow or even erroneous problem identification.)
Different observers, depending upon their views and interests, may perceive
different problems in the same set of events. The reasons a government declares
a situation a “problem” drive its efforts to fix it—and those reasons may have lit-
tle to do with what is important to other agencies of the international commu-
nity, the people experiencing the problem, or the military forces called upon to
deal with it. Those reasons will produce limitations upon intervening forces,
with respect to maximum costs (including military lives) and allowable conduct
(thus “rules of engagement”).
MISSION DETERMINATION
Determination that a serious problem exists is a prerequisite to action to remedy
or ameliorate it. Governments may choose after all not to act, because resources
are scarce or political considerations preclude commitment, or they may con-
tent themselves with criticizing or offering unsolicited advice. Only a decision
to spend real resources leads to commitment of military forces; because mili-
tary forces are valuable assets and have special status as embodiments of na-
tional prestige, a decision to use the military signifies a strong national
commitment to problem resolution. Such a decision may take time and be-
come the subject of internal political conflict. For this reason, military force is
likely to be committed only well after other institutions, particularly United Na-
tions agencies and nongovernmental organizations, have begun to act. The U.S.
military therefore typically begins to focus on a civil-military operation later
than do the international agencies with which it will work; that is a major disad-
vantage. To make matters worse, the U.S. military is so complex and hierarchical
that the troops who will conduct civil-military operations are almost never rep-
resented on Department of Defense (DoD) teams that negotiate prospective
civil-military operations in interagency meetings; they get their direction only
later, with little indication of context.
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When the National Command Authorities (the president, secretary of de-
fense, and their staffs) decide to deploy military forces, they provide guidance
and direction that will be translated into formal missions and then into orders.
The orders may describe the job vaguely or quite specifically, reflecting in vary-
ing degrees the personalities of senior leaders, their perceptions of national in-
terests and ethical considerations
involved, and their commitments to
human rights and democracy, inter-
national agreements, and treaties.
Orders also embody the domestic
ethical, political, cultural, or paro-
chial interests that led to problem
definition. These factors can limit or expand a mission, give it clarity or make it
opaque. In recent years, the key results of these concerns for the military have
been rules of engagement and force-protection directives—designed largely
to protect political and military leaders from the recriminations that often
follow casualties.
National-level orders may contain internal inconsistencies that make mis-
sions especially difficult or even impossible. By analyzing their directives, com-
manders can (though the literature suggests they rarely do) largely predict what
the courses of their operations will be if guidance is not modified. Flawed speci-
fications lead, if not to failure, to changes in missions while they are in progress.
The United States has a term for such adjustment to intelligence, policy, plan-
ning, and operational shortcomings: mission creep. Frequently, the seeds of fail-
ure in mission definitions are fairly obvious. In 1994, for example, no few
observers noted that while one might restore to power the winner of one of
Haiti’s few reasonably free presidential elections, it was (and remains in 2000)
impossible to “restore democracy” to a Haiti that in nearly two centuries of inde-
pendence had never been democratic. If they are to assemble, train, and lead
their forces successfully in civil-military operations, commanders responsible
for executing such orders must understand both the foreign situation and the
concerns that caused their missions to be constructed the way they were. Failure
to understand and provide for either one could cause an operation to fail out-
right, produce negative consequences, or lead to midcourse changes that de-
grade unit effectiveness and generate recriminations.
To say that military commanders must understand domestic concerns and
the perhaps somewhat hidden agendas of the National Command Authorities
does not mean that they should either second-guess or criticize their civilian su-
periors. Nor do efforts to unravel the subtleties of domestic and international
political processes amount to military meddling in civilian affairs. They are part
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of a command-and-staff preparation of the operational arena that is just as ap-
propriate and essential for complex civil-military operations as “intelligence
preparation of the battlefield” is for combat.5 A correct perception of political
concerns and agendas is required in order to achieve the civil objectives that are
at the core of the original decision to launch military operations. It is particu-
larly essential for commanders in fast-moving situations who must in essence
help make national policy on the fly.6 Unfortunately, however, the unified com-
mand staffs that draft operations plans appear rarely to consider such factors.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS
A presidential directive to carry out a complex civil-military operation abroad
mobilizes not only armed forces but a constellation of civilian agencies, which
participate in planning and coordination. These typically include the State De-
partment, the National Security Council staff, intelligence agencies, and the
Agency for International Development, particularly its Office of Foreign Disas-
ter Assistance, along with others as needed. Each entity has capabilities, perspec-
tives, objectives, and formal responsibilities that reflect its mandate and
individual culture. Each may have a different definition of the problem and a
different interpretation of the mission and how to conduct it. Interagency bat-
tles and policy disagreements often make coordination contentious and slow.
In response, the government has developed mechanisms for fostering coop-
eration. Some are embodied in formal institutions (like the National Security
Council), procedural orders (such as Presidential Decision Directive 56, for the
Clinton administration), and standing interagency “deputies committees.” Oth-
ers are less formal. The interagency coordination process helps reconcile percep-
tions, judgments, and objectives, but in practice it is complicated, and ever more so
as the number of agencies involved grows. Further, reconciliation is rarely complete,
and it often involves significant compromises. These compromises lead to divisions
of responsibilities on the basis not of operational effectiveness but “turf”concerns.
In recent operations, the Department of Defense has sought only thin—that
is, narrowly military—“slices” of responsibility for civil-military operations and
has worked hard to keep them thin. This effort to reduce the scope of its role in
potential civil-military operations reflects the fact that the DoD neither wants
nor prepares extensively for civil-military operations on a continuing basis. It
must therefore conduct even its sharply circumscribed—if typically very expen-
sive—parts of most civil-military operations in comparatively ad hoc fashion.
The predictable result of all the above is inefficient U.S. government response
to problems calling for civil-military intervention overseas. Elements of this in-
efficiency include, among other things, less than complete unity of effort, espe-
cially incomplete or overlapping command and control structures; forces whose
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size and composition have been determined by political considerations; fuzzy
statements of desired end-states, crafted more as public relations declarations or
advertisements of congenial redeployment (“exit”) dates than as meaningful
policy documents; and politically driven rules of engagement that interfere with
mission accomplishment. Rules of engagement are especially critical, in that
they establish much more than the conditions in which troops may fire their
weapons: they determine the nature and magnitude of military interactions
with civil agencies and with the local populace. They can facilitate, limit, or pre-
clude the accomplishment of a mission.
Once decisions about the division of labor among agencies of the U.S. gov-
ernment are made and the military role in a civil-military operation has been
roughly defined, DoD typically turns to its standard operations-planning mech-
anisms. These sometimes formidable procedures, as applied to complex
civil-military operations, make certain Defense Department operational and
procurement practices particularly important. These can be divided roughly
into five categories: institutions, doctrine, force structure, training, and equip-
ment. These factors determine in large measure the capabilities of a force; they
involve definitions, and produce consequences, for civil-military operations
that differ from those that arise for combat missions.
The Military Institutions of Civil-Military Operations
The Defense Department and the military services have institutional character-
istics that strongly influence their willingness and ability to conduct complex
civil-military operations—and thus their effectiveness when they do. These in-
stitutions extend well beyond buildings and organizational diagrams.
First, the U.S. military is a fairly insular subculture of American society, with
unique ways of doing business and of viewing the world. Honoring the “war-
rior” ethos, it is uncomfortable with the implications of elevating the status of
nonviolent conduct.7 Also, the hierarchical nature of military forces limits its
room for initiative and individuality. Men and women who commit themselves
to the military profession are for the most part at ease with such relative rigidity;
many are not entirely at home in less structured environments. However, an in-
ternational crisis that requires commitment of U.S. military force is likely to be
chaotic—both the triggering event itself and the response of the international
community. Moreover, the multilateral, combined nature of civil-military ef-
forts, wherein diplomatic requirements balance geopolitical interests and re-
sponsibilities, produces arrangements that sometimes differ sharply from the
unity of command that military people expect and appreciate.8 Their usual re-
sponse to the frustrating, strange, and confusing world they encounter is rigid
adherence to military norms. The complacency, even gloating, of U.S. troops at
G E N T R Y 6 3
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what they perceive as the superiority of military order to civilian chaos damages
their effectiveness as members of international civil-military teams.
Second, especially in the wake of defeat in Vietnam and the assertion of the
“Weinberger Doctrine” in the 1980s, and later the “Powell Doctrine,” the U.S.
military generally expects missions to be clearly stated, with explicit definitions
of success—ideally “victory”—and clear criteria for at least claiming it.9 The
world is, however, much too complex
to allow simple, bipolar defeat-vic-
tory or black-white paradigms of
performance; civil-military missions
usually deal in shades of gray. The
characteristic reluctance of American
military personnel to acknowledge
the complexities of the world is a formidable handicap to their success in opera-
tions other than war.
Relatedly, American military personnel, like Americans in general, tend to be
impatient people. They like quick results; they dislike the idea that some mis-
sions are achievable only in part, at considerable cost, and over long peri-
ods—and perhaps not at all. American military people prefer end-states that are
defined not only clearly but in terms of end-dates—like 20 December 1996, by
which President Clinton initially decreed that Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in
Bosnia would be concluded. The United States has shown little willingness in re-
cent years to make commitments to operations, like the Sinai, Cyprus, or North-
ern Ireland, whose duration has already been measured in decades (although a
proposed long-term commitment in Kosovo suggests that it has learned from
past mistakes). This impatience allows potential adversaries, and recalcitrant
factions in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, to use patience as a
tactic, even a strategy—simply to wait the Americans out.
Americans also are usually quite confident that they know how to accomplish
tasks without advice and that their values and ways of doing things are better
than other people’s. Much evidence indicates that this attitude annoys foreign-
ers, who do not appreciate cultural criticisms. Foreigners are likely to embrace
their own value systems as least as firmly as Americans hold to theirs. They are
especially likely to resent such carping when Americans display extraordinary
concern for their own safety and creature comforts at the expense of the collec-
tive. Even the British derisively call Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo—complete with
gymnasiums and a Burger King restaurant—“Disneyland.”10
U.S. personnel must understand their own cultural and collective psycholog-
ical tendencies in order to appreciate the vulnerabilities that others see, and per-
haps take advantage of, in the American military’s collective character. There is
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some good news here, however: some norms and attitudes characteristic of Amer-
ican military people—such as, in some contexts, their single-mindedness—im-
press “target” populations and potential colleagues. Commanders and
planners should understand these strengths and work to draw maximum ben-
efit from them.
In the organizational realm, Defense Department personnel policy typically
calls for rapid rotation and diverse assignments over the course of a career, pro-
ducing the solid generalist background that a good senior commander needs.
However, such assignments prevent individuals from developing expertise, and
units from maintaining institutional memories. Military personnel in major in-
telligence centers, for instance, take for granted that it is the civilian employees
who embody corporate memory; civilians, however, typically have little clout in
decision making and usually do not deploy on operations. In operational units,
rapid personnel turnover means that the process of training and education is
forever starting over. U.S. forces often deploy with little understanding of the ar-
eas in which they are to operate—and they learn little after they arrive.11 These
patterns are not conducive to good staff work, sound senior-level decision mak-
ing, or effective execution.
Finally, frequent terrorist attacks on Americans, including military person-
nel, have raised force protection as a major political and military concern. How-
ever well justified individually, the protective measures that have resulted have
seriously adverse consequences.12 In peacekeeping operations especially, close
contacts with inhabitants could speed the state of sustained security that would
allow withdrawal of the troops. Yet U.S. commanders in recent years have often
placed strict limits on such fraternization. Force protection exalted to this de-
gree is, far from a “force multiplier,” a force divisor—it makes necessary more
troops than the mission itself requires; it prohibits U.S. troops from conducting
certain activities that would be valuable; and it seems to reflect physical coward-
ice. In general, it diminishes the credibility of the commitment of American
forces to do what other coalition military contingents do.
There are other examples, but the general point is that U.S. institutional char-
acteristics, including culture, values, incentive systems, and procedures, have
significant and frequently adverse implications for the effectiveness of U.S.
forces in complex civil-military operations, particularly peacekeeping. Com-
manders and planners must assess these implications in the context of the goals
of their operations—whether military, political, economic, social, public health,
or environmental. They also must understand the institutions of the civil orga-
nizations, American and international, with which they work, and those of mili-
tary coalitions of which they are part.
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Doctrine
U.S. law and policy place civil-military operations below combat operations as
budgetary priorities. That means low priority for equipment procurement,
training, and doctrine —the development of shared techniques. In doctrine it-
self, inasmuch as it reflects the attitudes of “warfighters,” civil-military opera-
tions have an even lower standing. As a result, civil-military doctrine has been
limited, somewhat controversial, and inadequate.
The U.S. Army doctrinal publication on the subject, Field Manual 41-10,
Civil Affairs, is largely a “how-to” guide for organizing civil affairs units, supple-
mented by generic descriptions of the activities that they perform, to help com-
manders achieve mission goals through interaction with civilians and civil
institutions.13 However, there has never been a comprehensive listing of tasks, a
conceptual framework for civil affairs in operations other than war, or a descrip-
tion of what commanders, international organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations should be able to expect from U.S. civil affairs units in that setting.
Joint (multiservice) doctrine is modest at best; the Marine Corps, for instance,
conducts civil affairs differently than the Army. No doctrinal guide or formal
procedure places civil affairs or civil-military operations in a broad context or
helps practitioners understand the world of civil-military operations from a
conceptual perspective. Most importantly, the conventional units that conduct
operations with large civil-military components have essentially no doctrine to
guide their training or conduct.
Force Structure
The United States has virtually no troops dedicated to conducting civil-military
operations. The active Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and Special Forces
groups focus on civil-military operations extensively, but other regular units get
little relevant training prior to deployments. Reserve Army and Marine Corps
civil affairs troops have roles similar to that of the 96th CA Battalion but typi-
cally work in larger and longer-term operations. In either case, however, civil af-
fairs troops are primarily advisors and facilitators. The United States cannot
conduct even small-scale civil-military operations without conventional
units—which are structured, equipped, and trained primarily for traditional
combat or combat support.
In the absence of a standing, specialized force, and of either doctrine or ana-
lytical processes to aid the design of such a force, commanders who are given
civil-military operations missions must work with ad hoc assemblages of units.
The virtually inevitable result is that force structure in complex civil-military
operations is suboptimal. The biggest U.S. contribution to JOINT ENDEAVOR in
December 1995 was most of an armored division—helpful for peace enforcement
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but poorly suited to postwar peacekeeping. In late 1996, the United States replaced
some tank units in Bosnia with mechanized infantry and added more military po-
lice; this made the U.S. force more like the European nations’ original contingents.
Training
Complex civil-military operations have only a small place in the professional
training of the U.S. military; doctrine, however apt, is of little use unless troops
learn and practice it before they deploy. Because Congress has not declared
peacekeeping to be of major importance and the military itself views civil-mili-
tary operations as a tertiary priority, the nation’s forces as a whole are poorly
trained for both. While there are exceptions, the civil dimension of military op-
erations receives little classroom time and seldom appears meaningfully in the
scenarios of command-post and field exercises. This effectively ensures that de-
ploying units will not have adequately assessed the situations they are about to
enter, will not fully understand their explicit missions, let alone the implied
tasks, and will not have prepared for them. Each is essential.
Even formal instruction and exercises, however, are not enough. Training for
civil-military operations must also address the decision-making processes of the
U.S. government. Officers may have encountered this material in high school
civics courses, but the military does not address it systematically outside of se-
nior service schools. Similarly, there is no room in most military courses for de-
tailed treatments of foreign affairs. Promotion prospects are notoriously poor
for specialists like Foreign Area Officers, a fact that discourages officers from
pursuing such fields. Personnel-rotation policies, as noted, often diminish what-
ever expertise individuals may accumulate by regularly transferring them from
theater to theater. In mid-1996, for example, there were no U.S. military special-
ists on the Balkans in either the Implementation Force headquarters at Sarajevo
or in the U.S. National Intelligence Cell at Ilidza.14 Finally, training is needed on
international entities—at the global level, especially the United Nations; on re-
gional organizations such as the European Union and the Arab League; and on
the thousands of nongovernmental organizations, some of which will partici-
pate in any peacekeeping operation or humanitarian-relief mission.
Nongovernmental organizations rarely have roles in exercise play, and even spe-
cial operations troops have little contact with international organizations and
nongovernmental organizations when not deployed.15
The U.S. intelligence community has made complex civil-military operations
still more difficult in recent years by focusing on force protection at the expense
of mission execution. It has diverted, at the request of the Defense Department, hu-
man-intelligence collection resources that could foster understanding of situations
toward identification of “threats.”16 The overall result is a dearth of information in
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the U.S. government of the day-to-day political, social, and economic activities
of countries that could be sites of complex civil-military operations tomorrow.
The limited effort that intelligence agencies devote to foreign societies, as such,
makes any new crisis more likely to be a surprise and hinders preparations and
planning for deployments to respond to it. Military institutional practices already
mentioned, such as short tours and deployment of “grab bags” of personnel and
units sometimes chosen with more regard for the services’ bureaucratic desires
than for unit qualifications, ensures that what little understanding exists cannot be
adequately applied to the planning and conduct of civil-military operations.
Equipment
U.S. conventional military units typically do not have equipment designed spe-
cially for peacekeeping operations or other such missions. In Bosnia, for exam-
ple, tactical vehicles, built wide to resist rolling over, often do not fit in narrow
Bosnian streets or on makeshift replacement bridges, which are just wide
enough for a single narrow, European vehicle. Army civil affairs troops who
traveled extensively in hilly terrain in 1996 had no good communications equip-
ment and borrowed Motorola handheld radios from the Office of the High Rep-
resentative—itself a woefully underequipped organization. U.S. units initially
did not have riot-control gear, because the military refused to involve itself in
“police” duties.
At the same time, much equipment designed for combat and combat sup-
port, especially engineer and transportation equipment, could be useful in com-
plex civil-military operations. A sound assessment of the physical setting of a
civil-military operation, along with analysis of the international community’s
objectives (those that are also objectives of the United States), should lead staff
planners to anticipate the equipment needs of stated and implied tasks.
A concomitant study of the physical resources and deficiencies of prospective
international and nongovernmental partners would suggest what assistance
these civil organizations are likely to request. U.S. commanders in complex
civil-military operations should expect to share equipment (in which coalition
partners are likely to consider them rich) and to use their equipment and people
to provide services. Moreover, they should take for granted that requests may be-
come orders; if they do not either share equipment or supply services, they can
expect civil agencies to lobby Washington with sufficient energy to stimulate di-
rectives through the military chain of command. Many international and
nongovernmental organizations are familiar with political processes and have
the ears of decision makers in Washington and other capitals, and in UN of-
fices in New York and Geneva.17 Indeed, many of these entities are based in
Washington or are staffed heavily by Americans. It is essential that commanders
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and their staffs understand their equipment strengths and limitations in the con-
text of the civil-military operations environment as well as the needs of interna-
tional civil agencies—and that this awareness be prominent in mission planning
and execution.
Capabilities
The major contribution of the military in a civil-military operation may be to
prevent war or large-scale violence, by the presence and potential use of ground
combat power and, to a much lesser extent, air and naval power. While specifics
vary by force structure and operation, the capabilities of the U.S. military to sup-
port the international community in complex interventions are likely to be con-
centrated in a few discrete functional areas: air and ground transport, especially
the transportation of civilian members of the international mission, the press,
displaced persons and refugees, and supplies; medical facilities and skills; mili-
tary police services, to help establish security, conduct reconnaissance, and pro-
vide security-related equipment and training; engineering equipment and skills,
including road and bridge repair, water desalinization and purification, and
land-mine neutralization; and public information and communications, in-
cluding radio and television programming. In addition, American military
air-traffic management is useful until a local government or international re-
gime can restore scheduled civil air transportation, as are civilian technical skills
(embodied in some civil affairs personnel) in a wide variety of areas. Further,
characteristic U.S. military organizational skills, discipline, and standard oper-
ating procedures may be valuable to under-resourced civil agencies, especially
ad hoc bodies that are not well led or that international diplomatic imperatives
have made inefficient.18
Finally, American resources can inject a financial stimulus, through the hir-
ing of local workers and purchases of locally produced light-industrial products
(such as building materials) and consumer goods (such as bakery items). The
hard currency thus introduced may be invaluable for monetary systems in
shambles. Contractors (such as Dyncorp and Brown & Root) that provide logis-
tical support for U.S. components of civil-military operation should be made
integral parts of the planning processes.
The value of American wealth to civil-military operations and “target” locali-
ties is diminished, however, by the small amount of cash allocated to field units.
Also, the complexities of interagency financial transfers make it difficult for, say,
an engineer unit to use Agency for International Development funds to repair a
bridge.19 Cash may be essential for even small-scale civil-military projects that
require procurement of local resources.20
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In general, the impact of an international intervention force on a locality is a
question that U.S. military planners typically do not address but that may
heavily influence the effectiveness of the American military contribution. Deci-
sion makers may assess certain of the pieces of the situation correctly but fail to
place them in complete context or to anticipate the dynamic effects of an “occu-
pation” force. They are more likely to define and perceive military areas of re-
sponsibility geographically than functionally. Even the format of operations
plans—designed for combat operations—inhibits sophisticated analysis. For
example, it pushes staff planners to cram local and international institutions
into template-driven categories like “friendly forces” and “enemy forces.”
The United States thus may design, and pressure the international commu-
nity to accept, relief programs or peace processes that fail to address key ele-
ments of the conflict—in military jargon, the “center of gravity.” Such an
intervention is likely to fail. Planning fails if it does not address key issues, ad-
dresses them in dysfunctional ways, or introduces stresses that prolong a conflict
by encouraging its spillover into other arenas. The latter can happen when a mil-
itary intervention is so lengthy or offensive to local sensibilities that it generates
an insurgency against the force itself. The transparent pro-Muslim bias of the
United States in Bosnia risks stimulating such a reaction among Bosnian Serbs
and, to a lesser extent, Bosnian Croats. Nato forces have alienated both Serb and
ethnic Albanian sensitivities in Kosovo, further damaging prospects for achieve-
ment of the alliance’s ostensible goal of a peaceful, pluralistic Kosovo.
Its abundance of human and physical resources often makes the U.S. military
a particularly significant member of a civil-military team, despite the sometimes
narrow applicability of its resources and its lack of sophistication about how to
use them. The ultimate usefulness of its assets in a given operation depends
upon the situation, force composition, the extent to which military assets com-
plement those of local and international civil agencies, and a host of intangible
factors, including interpersonal relations. U.S. joint doctrine does not address
these issues well. The regional commands that typically plan American military
contributions to civil-military operations have no structural capacity to address
them either, let alone use nontraditional methods to prepare for deployments.21
These handicaps are formidable.
MEASURING PROGRESS AND INSTITUTIONALIZING LESSONS
It is essential that the Defense Department and the government as a whole have
ways to measure progress of civil-military operations both as they unfold—against
stated objectives and also in comparison to the actual situation—and when they
have ended, to institutionalize lessons. Despite expenditure of substantial
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resources and notwithstanding some progress, the United States (like the inter-
national community as a whole) is not close to achieving either goal.
While individual people and country desks at the State Department and in
the intelligence community follow developments and watch certain issues
closely, there is no government-wide analytic framework for such assessments
and no organization to sponsor them. Nor are there effective means to ensure in-
teragency communications; if anything, turf concerns hamper them. There is
thus no usable set (or collection of sets) of measures of effectiveness to assist
policy and decision making, to be embedded in military plans, or to use in the
field. Such measures must be sophisticated and flexible enough to be tailored to
each situation; this is a difficult task. The often-used but crude “stoplight”
charts—red-amber-green “metrics” of easily observable variables—may be use-
less or even counterproductive if they oversimplify complex situations, inaccu-
rately and incompletely measure key variables or address peripheral ones, or
stimulate unwarranted confidence about how well the situation “outside the
wire” is understood.
Most after-action reviews and Joint Universal Lessons Learned System re-
ports focus on narrow aspects of operations. While these official vehicles can be
useful in certain respects (not least for historians), many of these papers have
several unfortunate characteristics. They describe only specific local operations;
they are unable, because of their brevity and narrowness in functional and tem-
poral terms, to establish the broader context of the society a military interven-
tion has influenced.22 They offer only anecdotal measures of what worked and
what did not, ending with a jumble of incompletely explained or sourced com-
ments, and recommendations of tactics whose histories may well be checkered.
Moreover, after-action reports are inherently political documents; self-censor-
ship limits their candor and completeness, and therefore their accuracy and
credibility. Some are quashed in draft as politically incorrect, especially if they
reflect decisions that, with hindsight, might be judged to have been mistakes.
This is ironic, since (as should be no surprise) they are little read or heeded in
any case.
When high-quality recommendations do arise, there is no formal mechanism
for transferring them into U.S. policy formulation and operational planning
processes. That is, there is no consistent way for the lessons of an operation to
enter the process of situation monitoring, problem identification, or policy de-
cision making at the national level, or planning and operational preparations in
the Defense Department. The unified commands that prepare operational plans
are largely independent fiefdoms with no requirements or incentives to study
the past or the current operations of other commands. Their staffs may well feel
they have no time to collect and study such material, even if they wanted to;
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neither do they like either to ask for or receive advice from other organiza-
tions—particularly civilian ones.
Systematic data gathering and assessment of the civil aspects of civil-military
operations would greatly aid in the crafting of measures of effectiveness. It
would also enable intelligence officers, State Department desk officers, and De-
fense Department personnel to identify trends that could give rise to problems
the United States will feel obliged to
address. Purposeful early warning
would identify opportunities for ac-
tion that could, in some cases, pre-
c lude any need for mi l i tar y
intervention. Also, with a coherent
model of worldwide trouble spots and a body of experience in hand, policy mak-
ers and military planners could better prepare forces for deployments where
they are needed.
Rudimentary measures can be found outside the U.S. government. The Fund
for Peace has a generic twelve-indicator scheme, based to a large degree on phy-
sicians’ assessments of the incidence of diseases; this may be a good approach,
because failed states and civil conflict are arguably the collective societal equiva-
lent of disease.23 Humanitarian nongovernmental organizations have good
measures on disease outbreaks. The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction
Corps in Bosnia developed in 1996 “normality indicators” to measure a number
of symptoms of normalcy.24 Canada also uses normality indicators.
Certainly some lessons of experience do reach troops, policy makers, and vot-
ers. Most Americans believe that dead American soldiers should not again be
dragged through streets; most Americans now think that the Vietnam War was
“bad.” However, these are matters of folklore, not systematic learning processes
that appropriately introduce meaningful lessons into decision making, analytic
processes, and information and intelligence collection. Indeed, such partial
learning may be counterproductive when its “lessons” are based on factual error,
poor judgments, or bias.
Even with such a data-gathering and analytical framework, there will be plan-
ning and operational obstacles. Chronic opposition of conventional military
personnel to special operations was so great that Congress in 1986 created the
U.S. Special Operations Command over their objections and gave it an inde-
pendent budget. In 1995, resistance within the armed forces to complex
civil-military operations was widespread enough during the Dayton talks to
prompt Richard Holbrooke, then assistant secretary of state, to decry Pentagon
“minimalists” who were trying to avoid a role in Bosnia.25 This attitude evidently
continues today.
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SELF-EVIDENT REALITY
The failures and flawed successes of recent years in complex civil-military oper-
ations and the evident unwillingness of the Defense Department to adapt to
self-evident reality indicate that fundamental institutional changes are required.
Legislation may again be necessary; current law, emphasizing as it does (appro-
priately enough) traditional security threats, gives the Defense Department an
excuse to avoid preparing for civil-military operations. An example is the con-
gressional and executive-branch attitude that annual supplemental or emer-
gency appropriations are adequate ways to pay for such unwelcome, if chronic,
obligations as civil-military operations in places like Bosnia and Kosovo. Even
narrowly military functions inevitably are affected by the ad hoc decision mak-
ing this practice reflects and engenders, and by the budgetary “taxes” on the rest
of the Defense Department that are a direct result. Such unwillingness to ad-
dress civil-military operations directly and on a long-term basis causes disrup-
tion throughout the department, even as it hinders the planning and execution
of operations that arise.
The military’s internal culture is another issue. The denigration of foreign
area and political expertise, as well as Defense-wide policies that disperse what-
ever skills exist, will continue, in the absence of internal reforms, to hamper the
ability of the U.S. military to conduct sophisticated civil-military operations.
The result is foreign-affairs amateurs planning civil-military operations for re-
gional commanders in chief without the benefit of pertinent service, joint doc-
trine, or such wisdom as arises from recent experience. This is a major
leadership challenge at the national level; it may warrant another “Goldwater-
Nichols” act.
All of this points to the value of an interagency body composed of diplomats,
intelligence officers, and military personnel—perhaps aided by adjunct aca-
demics and representatives from international and nongovernmental organiza-
tions—to assist military planners when civil-military operations loom. Such a
group could work as interagency organizations now do, and thus avoid the ap-
pearance of a radical and threatening institutional change, but could focus on
areas in which there have been clear problems. It could better mobilize the re-
sources of member agencies; supply analytic rigor and broad regional or histori-
cal context; and generate intelligence-collection requirements, identifying
categories of data that would help the United States to determine how it could be
useful and to assess results.26
A reorganized Joint Forces (formerly Atlantic) Command with its new
force-provider mission might establish a standing joint task force devoted to
civil-military operations. Such a force would be able to respond globally to pro-
vide expertise and institutional memory to regional commanders in chief.
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Congress may prefer to consider giving the U.S. Special Operations Command
expanded responsibility for planning and conducting civil-military operations.
Alternatively, the Defense Department or Congress might direct the Army to
create a new force specifically for peacekeeping operations and other civil-mili-
tary operations, building it around a division headquarters having
larger-than-normal intelligence, logistics, and civil-military sections but small
fire-support elements. The division or joint task force–equivalent ought to be
unusually “rank heavy,” to allow it to function in diplomatically sensitive envi-
ronments. It might regularly contain medical, transportation, military police,
intelligence, and engineer units but acquire combat battalions only in support-
ing roles and as needed. In a reversal of usual practice, the traditional “combat
support” elements listed above would be the “teeth” of civil-military operations.
Detachments of this unit would form the planning and headquarters elements
of military contingents for proposed civil-military operations.
Defense-wide institutional changes also are needed in command emphasis,
doctrine, and training in many individual disciplines that are critical to mission
success in civil-military operations. The RAND Corporation has demonstrated
convincingly, for instance, that the peacekeeping operations of the mid-1990s
had markedly negative effects on the performance of the U.S. Air Force as a
whole; it has proposed, in essence, that the Air Force do its peacekeeping opera-
tions tasks in a new way.27 The ground portions of civil-military operations,
which typically are much more complex, can also be much improved. The U.S.
military role in complex civil-military operations, in all its aspects, merits fun-
damental reconsideration and reform.
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